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The Humanity of Advocacy
Remarks of Barry Sullivan*
Let me begin with a story. Some time ago, when I was practicing
law, I was asked to judge a high school debate competition. I said I
would check my schedule. I did not know much about the current state
of high school debate, let alone what kinds of skills a debater was
supposed to show to win. I decided to investigate a little before I
decided whether to sign on. I went to the web and immediately found a
description of "team policy debate"-apparently the dominant form of
high school and college debate:
Team policy debate is focused on evidence gathering and
organizational ability. Persuasiveness is not considered important-or
at least, not as important as covering ground and reading plenty of
evidence. The best teams have huge fileboxes packed to the gills with
evidence on their own affirmative case and all the possible cases they
might have to oppose. If you ever walk into a high-level team debate
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round, expect to see debaters talking at extremely high speeds, reading
out the content of page after page of evidence, gasping for breath
between points, and using lots of jargon ("I cite Jorgensen, Jorgensen
post-dates Bronstein, that kills PMR 4, flow that Aff!"). There is very
little discussion of values such as freedom, justice, equality, etc. 1
I had several reactions to this description. First, teaching research
and organizational skills to students interested in public policy (which I
assume most debaters are) is not a bad thing. Teaching students how to
evaluate the evidence they uncover (for example, how many people
expert in the field would agree with the description of team policy
debate I found on the web) is also a good thing. Second, my reaction to
the rest of the description was one of bewilderment. If all that work
does not relate to the goal of persuasion, what is the point? Third, I
wondered why I had been asked to be a judge of this activity. I saw
little connection between what I did in my professional life and an
activity that did not involve persuasion or values but required students
to talk "at extremely high speeds"-something that I simply cannot do.
Finally, I doubted very much that I would enjoy an afternoon spent
listening to high school students "talking at extremely high speeds" and
''gasping for breath."
My decision was not difficult, but the exercise was worthwhile. It
led me to reflect on what it is that I actually do-what appellate
advocates do-and the ways in which what we do as advocates is
fundamentally different from what I have just described. I would like to
share some of those reflections with you this afternoon.
My title might seem a bit puzzling. What, after all, is "human" about
"legal advocacy"? It seems to me that there are three ways in which
advocacy is related to what it means to be human. The first is grounded
in the nature of legal disputes and in our expectations as a society about
how such disputes are to be resolved. To be human is to have our own
ideas and interests, which are often in conflict with those of others.2
1. Glen Whitman, Debate Formats, DEBATE, http://www.csun.edu/-dgw61315/debformats
.html (last modified Sept. 5, 2000).
2. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("As long
as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be
formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and
his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to
which the latter attach themselves . . . . The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of
man; and we see them every where brought into different degrees of activity, according to the
different circumstances of civil society."); see also TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 85 (2010)
("In Utopia, it may be, civil disputes would never arise: the citizens would live together in amity,
and harmony would reign. But we live in a sub-utopian world, in which differences do arise, and
it would be false to suppose that they only arise where there is dishonesty, sharp practice, malice,
xxiv [Vol. 42
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Moreover, when those conflicting ideas and interests present themselves
for resolution as legal disputes, rather than in some other way (such as
by compromise or force, for example), we expect them to be resolved in
a way that is fair and just, even though we may differ as to what fairness
and justice entails, either generally or in a particular case.3 This, I
think, is what Ken Geller meant when he said that an advocate's task is
to persuade the court that the world will be a better place, in one way or
another, by a little or a lot, if the court accepts the advocate's
submission.4
Second, advocacy has to do with what it means to be human because
of the fundamentally human character of the lawyer-client relationship,
and of the act of sharing expert legal knowledge, judgment, and advice
with another human being in need of those things. I have attempted
elsewhere to describe the basic humanity of that relationship and of the
lawyer's general obligation to provide counsel to those in need of it.5 I
would also add, however, that the essentially human character of this
relationship also implies the necessity of certain limits, so that the act of
providing legal counsel requires respect for the humanity and autonomy
of both the client and the lawyer, and can never adequately be
described, to use Marshall Field's words, as simply "giv[ing] the lady
what she wants." 6
The third way in which I think that legal advocacy has to do with
humanity relates to the activity itself. Unlike "team policy debate,"
legal advocacy does have to do with persuasion, and persuasion,
whether in a legal context or otherwise, is a quintessentially human
activity. (What "team policy debaters" do is also human, of course, but
greed or obstinacy on one side or the other. Those qualities are not unknown among litigants. But
it is possible for perfectly reasonable and well-motivated people to hold very different views on
the meaning of a contract or a conveyance or a will, or about the responsibility for an accident, or
about the upbringing of children following their parents' separation, or about the use of a
footpath, or the application of an Act of Parliament or the decision of a minister or local
government officer.").
3. See STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 79 (2000) ("There is one overriding moral
principle that every citizen has good reasons to accept and to honor in practice: that is the
principle of institutionalized fairness for the resolution of these conflicts.").
4. Stephen M. Shapiro, Oral Argument in the Supreme Court of the United States, 33 CATH.
U. L. REV. 529, 538 (1984) (quoting remarks by Kenneth S. Geller at the Conference on Supreme
Court Advocacy, Oct. 18, 1983).
5. See generally Barry Sullivan, Private Practice, Public Profession: Convictions,
Commitments, and the Availability of Counsel, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2005) (arguing that the
legal profession serves the dual purposes of providing legal representation to those who cannot
represent themselves and of promoting societal justice).
6. LLOYD WENDT & HERMAN KOGAN, GIVE THE LADY WHAT SHE WANTS! THE STORY OF
MARSHALL FIELD & COMPANY 223 (1952).
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in another sense-in the sense of sport.) A legal dispute may be simple,
or it may be highly technical and complex. The stakes may be large or
small. The outcome may affect only the immediate parties; it may
affect the immediate parties and a few others; or it may even affect the
whole society. Indeed, in today's world, the outcome in some cases
might affect the prospects for world peace, the stability of the world
environment, or the health of the global economy. Whatever shape the
dispute takes, the advocate must present it in a way that the decision-
maker-whoever that might be-can understand both the facts and the
equities, the cameo of the case and the diorama of the legal background.
The advocate may be tempted by those false gods, jargon and prolixity,
but they provide no cover; they are no substitute for explanation and
argument. The decision-maker will need to be persuaded, according to
certain rules and conventions to be sure, but also through the
development of a deep, personal conviction as to what the facts are,
what is true and what is not, who is right and who is wrong, and what is
just in the circumstances. As Justice Frankfurter, that most austere of
judges, said long ago, "[T]here comes a point where this Court should
not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men."7 It is this third
way in which legal advocacy has to do with what it is to be human that I
would like to explore this afternoon.
For some, legal argument is wholly artificial at best, deceptive and
manipulative at worst. One sometimes has the sense that advocacy is
the art (if it is an art) that dare not speak its name. One hears the charge
that lawyers will argue anything for a price (usually a large one), or that
the aim of advocacy is simply to persuade someone that what is true is
false and what is false is true. Indeed, that view has ancient roots. In
Gorgias, when Plato has Chaerephon ask Polus what art it is that his
master, Gorgias the rhetor, practices, Polus responds by praising his
master, but without answering the question:
[E]xperience causes our life to proceed by art, whereas inexperience
causes it to proceed by chance. Of each of these arts, various men
variously partake of various ones, and the best men partake of the
best; among these is Gorgias here, and he has a share in the finest of
the arts. 8
It is only when Socrates and Gorgias return to the conversation that
there is any real attempt to answer the question. Gorgias asserts that his
art consists of "being able to persuade by speeches judges in the law
court, councilors in the council, assemblymen in the assembly, and in
7. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
8. PLATO, GORGIAS 27 (James H. Nichols, Jr. ed., 1998).
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every other gathering whatsoever." 9 But what is the relationship of
such persuasion to real knowledge or truth, to morality or humanity? If
the rhetor is better able than the physician to persuade a patient of the
need for treatment, as Gorgias claims, is the rhetor's art simply "to
appear to know more than those who know, to those who don't," as
Socrates suggests? 10 Or, since "each group of men rejoice at speeches
said in accord with their own character,"" is persuasion nothing more
than flattery?
Aristotle teaches that different subjects admit different degrees of
certainty, that they therefore warrant different modes of inquiry, and
that different arguments about things that cannot be known with
certainty necessarily will move different people in different ways and to
varying degrees. 12  That is because people bring different knowledge
and experience to the reckoning of those matters that cannot be known
with certainty, but nonetheless require some sort of rigorous inquiry and
the exercise of prudential judgment. 13  Thus, as even Plato
acknowledges in Phaedrus, a speech must fit the audience. 14
What is the best diplomatic or military strategy for our nation at the
present time? There may or may not be one right answer to this
question. Most likely, there is not. In any event, there is more to the
formulation of public policy than simply getting the facts straight.
There is a need for judgment and thus for persuasion. Churchill made
this point with clarity in My Early Life, where he reflected on his early
failures in the House of Commons, noting that he "was [then] so
untutored as to suppose that all [he] had to do was to think out what was
right and express it fearlessly."15
What is the most felicitous rule of law available to remedy a
particular social problem? What is the best application of an accepted
rule of law in certain specific circumstances? These are the questions
9. Id.
10. Id. at 41.
11. Id. at 112.
12. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS: ARISTOTLE 18-19 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).
13. Id. at 157 ("Practical wisdom ... is concerned with human affairs and with matters about
which deliberation is possible. ... [N]o one deliberates about things that cannot be other than
they are, nor about things that are not directed to some end, an end that is a good attainable by
action.").
14. See PLATO, PHAEDRUS 80-81 (James H. Nichols, Jr. ed., 1998) ("And, now ... having
arranged in order the classes of speeches and of soul and the things experienced by these, he will
go through all the causes, fitting each together to each, and teaching through what cause one soul,
being of such a sort, is of necessity persuaded by speeches of such a sort, and another remains
unpersuaded.").
15. wINSTON S. CHURCHILL, My EARLY LIFE: A ROVING COMMISSION 369 (1930).
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that regularly concern legislators, executive officials, judges, and
citizens, albeit in different ways and to different degrees. These also are
questions that concern us as advocates. These questions are similar in
kind, of course, to those that ask about a nation's best diplomatic or
military strategy.
When questions of this kind are presented in the context of litigation,
we are told by some that a definitive answer can always be found in the
words of the relevant text. Others tell us that there is no way of
ascertaining any principled answer, let alone a definitive one, and that
judges inevitably will reach whatever result they like and then backfill
with legal verbiage to justify the bias with which they began. Neither
description is adequate. When questions of this kind are presented, an
obvious answer may sometimes exist. But there may be no obvious
answer. Or there may be more than one, and each may be wrong.
Judges, like the rest of us, sometimes will have to make choices in the
face of uncertainty. And those choices must be explained and justified,
albeit in ways that can only be persuasive and not definitive.
Otherwise, judges will not be able to do honestly what they must of
necessity do.16
So what do I mean by "the humanity of advocacy," and what does it
require of us who practice the art? By the "humanity of advocacy," I
mean the essentially human quality of the activity of argument and
persuasion, the process that aims to elicit honest judgment. What that
entails, in the case of legal judgment, are the elements of intellectual
inquiry, prudential calculation, and the ultimate exercise of authority,
power, and will. Judges have the same training and the same toolboxes
that we have as advocates. Like advocates, judges necessarily engage
real problems, and they do so under conditions of uncertainty, where
choices must be made-and justified-among plausible alternatives.
But judges also have a broader view than many advocates. They have
seen many cases and have heard many arguments. What may seem
novel to an advocate may seem routine to an experienced judge. What
may seem to an advocate to be egregious, sharp practice on the part of
her opponent may well seem to be within the range of reasonable
advocacy to a judge, or at least not worth the judicial time and effort it
might take to get to the bottom of it.
Of course, judges also have the power to decide, which advocates do
not have, and a special responsibility comes with that power. I like to
16. See generally H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF CONsTTrUIONAL DECISION (2008) (arguing that the Constitution requires judges
to engage in moral and good faith decision making and to be guided by individual conscience).
xxviii [Vol. 42
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think that the work of judges, to borrow a phrase from Yeats, is "to
hold, in a single thought, reality and justice,"' 7 and to instantiate that
thought. But judges cannot do their work unless we do ours. Thus, the
humanity of advocacy also speaks importantly to the ways in which we
argue and hope to persuade. We are beset by uncertainty, but we are
morally obliged, as advocates and judges, to make choices among
plausible alternatives, and to justify those choices. In doing so, we put
ourselves at risk in service to an activity that is essential to our common
humanity.
Let me talk a bit about the lawyer's task of persuasion in the
appellate courts. To my mind, there are four great questions of
appellate advocacy. First, how does one persuade an appellate court
that the articulation, reiteration, or elaboration of a particular rule of law
requires your client's position to be upheld, even though the apparent
equities of the case point toward the opposite result? Alternatively,
when the law seems to point against your client's position, how does
one persuade an appellate court that, given the particular equities of the
case, your client's position should be upheld, and that the court can do
that without damaging the existing fabric of the law? More radically,
how does one persuade such a court that the existing fabric of law does
indeed need a fundamental overhaul? Or, in the face of strong evidence
that the law does need such an overhaul, how does one persuade to the
contrary? These questions may be complicated in a particular case, of
course, by additional considerations, such as the proper allocation of the
burdens of production and persuasion in the court of first impression or
by the appropriate standard of review on appeal.' 8 But these, without
doubt, are the four great questions of appellate advocacy.
So how does one persuade? In The Art of Rhetoric, Aristotle
famously identifies three elements essential to persuasion: logos, ethos,
and pathos. In Aristotle's view, logos (knowledge or demonstration) is
essential, but more than logos is required:
[S]ince the objective of rhetoric is judgment (for men give judgment
on political issues and a court case is a judgment), we must have
regard not only to the speech's being demonstrative and persuasive,
17. SEAMUS HEANEY, CREDITING POETRY: THE NOBEL LECTURE 23-24 (1995) (quoting
W.B. Yeats).
18. And these questions are obviously subject to further refinements. In some cases, the
equities of a particular case and the existing law will point in the same direction, by a little or a
lot, to the benefit or detriment of one's client. If they both point against one party or the other,
the case probably should have been settled a long time ago.
2010] xxix
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but also to establishing the speaker himself as of a certain type and
bringing the giver ofjudgment into a certain condition.19
James Gould Cozzens echoes Aristotle in The Just and the Unjust, a
novel of great insight about lawyers and their work. Cozzens comments
on one advocate's courtroom performance:
Bunting was not an eloquent speaker . . .. [U]nlike Harry, who could
speak in many manners, and in all of them give the impression of
naturalness and simplicity, Bunting had only one manner, and he
unselfconsciously was natural and simple. Along with the virtue, he
had the vice of unselfconsciousness. Absorbed in what he wished to
say, he never thought of standing off and looking at himself to see
how he was doing, or of asking himself if this were the way he would
like to be talked to.20
Cozzens, of course, is talking about a lawyer's performance in a jury
trial, and jury trials are different from appellate proceedings. But we
make a mistake when we think that appellate arguments have only to do
with "logos" and nothing at all to do with "pathos" or "ethos."
Appellate judges may or may not be moved by the same arguments that
move jurors, but we do know that they are not lifeless, mechanical
beings. Certainly, appellate judges are not indifferent to the way in
which they are "talked to." Nor are they immune to the emotions
produced by boring, repetitive, fantastic, or ill-conceived written and
oral presentations. And appellate judges are not indifferent to the
appearance an advocate makes, not in the sense of appropriate clothing
and grooming or demeanor and diction (though these will certainly
carry weight with some), but in the sense of exaggeration or hyperbole
or the apparent accuracy (or not) with which an advocate presents her
client's case, both orally and in writing. Advocates who appear to
exaggerate or prevaricate will not be believed. If they substitute such
things for the hard work of thinking about how to persuade those who
are to judge their case, they also risk losing sight of the realities of their
case, to the detriment of their clients and their own self-interest. They
may or may not be called out. Whether they are makes little difference,
except, perhaps, in terms of embarrassment. The important thing is that,
whether or not they are called out, their clients' cause-and their own
reputations-may well be damaged.
But the challenge of advocacy is more subtle than that. Let me give
an example. In the "enemy combatant" cases of the past decade, as in
earlier cases involving executive power, the executive branch of
19. ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF RHETORIC 140 (Hugh Lawson-Tancred ed., 1991).
20. JAMES GOULD COZZENS, THE JUST AND THE UNJUST 360 (1942).
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government has made extravagant claims about the scope of executive
power and the non-reviewability of its exercise.21  Whether such
extravagant arguments were necessary to provide an adequate defense
for the government's policy is an issue I leave for another day. What
interests me for now is the opening of the government's oral argument
in one of those cases, namely Rasul v. Bush,22 which involved the
federal courts' jurisdiction over habeas cases brought by detainees at
Guantanamo. As you will recall, the government's argument was made
by the Solicitor General, Ted Olson, an experienced and respected
appellate advocate. As respondent, he spoke second. He began in this
way:
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court.
The United States is at war. Over 10,000 American troops are in
Afghanistan today in response to a virtually unanimous Congressional
declaration of an unusual and . . . extraordinary threat to our national
security, and an authorization to the President to use all necessary and
appropriate force to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the
United States.
It's in that context that Petitioners ask this Court to assert jurisdiction
that is not authorized by Congress, does not arise from the
Constitution, [and] has never been exercised by this Court ... 23
Justice Stevens then broke in with a series of questions intended to
demonstrate that the government's legal argument did not really depend
on the fact that "[t]he United States is at war"-a point that Olson was
required to concede after several more questions. In other words, the
opening, powerful as it may have seemed in the abstract, provoked one
of the Justices to move the colloquy in a direction where Olson had
nothing to gain and did not need or want to go. The opening was
powerful from a rhetorical point of view; it probably reflected Olson's
21. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952) ("The
Government's position is that the order was made on findings of the President that his action was
necessary to avert a national catastrophe which would inevitably result from a stoppage of steel
production, and that in meeting this grave emergency the President was acting within the
aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation's Chief Executive and the Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States."); see also Barry Sullivan, Justice Jackson's
Republic and Ours, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 172-74 (H. Jefferson
Powell & James Boyd White eds., 2009) (discussing Youngstown and, in particular, Justice
Jackson's test to measure the constitutionality of executive actions).
22. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction
to decide the habeas petitions of Guantanamo prisoners), superseded by statute, Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-1006, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (codified
as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 notes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e), and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §
2000dd (2006)), as recognized in Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
23. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (No. 03-334), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/03-334.pdf.
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own deeply-held convictions; and it was likely to be appreciated both by
Olson's clients and by those Justices who already were firmly in his
camp. But it came a half hour into the Court's consideration of the case
and it was not likely to resonate with any Justice who was not
predisposed to accept the government's position.
It would not have been difficult to predict that one of the Justices
would respond in the way that Justice Stevens did, or that the
momentum of the argument would thus be broken. Perhaps, Olson
thought that his message was important and that that risk was worth it.
Hindsight, of course, is a great thing. But how should we evaluate this
choice? Was Olson able to put himself in the place of the Justices, in
terms of their likely understanding of the work they had to do in the
case? Did he think about the figure he cut? Was this the way in which
the Justices whose votes he needed wanted to be "talked to"? In a
sense, the reminder was simply gratuitous: everyone in the courtroom
knew that the nation was at war. Indeed, it was well-known to most
people in the courtroom-and certainly to all of the Justices-that
Olson's wife had been killed in the September 11 attack on the
Pentagon. In these circumstances, was this an effective way to begin
the argument? Given Olson's personal loss, and what the Justices knew
about it, would a more understated beginning have been more effective?
We had a spirited debate on that question in my class last fall.
In Thinking of Others, Ted Cohen, University of Chicago philosophy
professor, writes: "Thinking of one person as another is a bemusing and
mysterious enterprise, but if I am right, the ability to do this is a
fundamental human capacity without which our moral and aesthetic
lives would scarcely be possible."24 Particularly critical, of course, is
the ability to see oneself as someone else, not as that person would be if
he were you, but as he is. That is a tall order. Taking an example from
Genesis, Cohen suggests that it is impossible to "begin to grasp" the
story of Abraham and Isaac without trying "to appreciate Abraham, and
that means asking what it would be like to be Abraham." 25 Cohen
compares Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac to Agamemnon's
sacrifice of Iphigenia. The difference, Cohen explains, is that
Agamemnon had a choice, while Abraham did not. God had spoken to
Abraham, and Abraham already had agreed to do whatever God
required of him.
To understand Abraham, one must try and imagine what it is like to
have God speak to you. Cohen writes:
24. TED COHEN, THINKING OF OTHERS: ON THE TALENT FOR METAPHOR 13 (2008).
25. Id. at 53.
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Can you imagine what it would be like to be spoken to by God? Can
you imagine believing God is speaking to you?
I have heard it said, "I would not kill my son even if God told me to
do it," or "I would not believe it was God asking me to kill my son."
My first thought is yes, I too wouldn't believe it was God asking, and
if I did, I wouldn't do what He asked. But then I think-what would it
be like-really-to believe God was speaking to me? 26
As Cohen suggests, we cannot begin to understand the story of
Abraham and Isaac unless we try to put ourselves in Abraham's place
and imagine having God speak to us in the way He spoke to Abraham.
But equally important is "the effort to appreciate how one may be
appreciated by others." 27  This is particularly difficult because, as
Cohen notes, it "requires . . . both leaving yourself and bringing
yourself along." 28 This is what Bunting was not able to do in The Just
and the Unjust and what Olson perhaps failed to do in the opening to his
argument in Rasul. In conclusion, Cohen observes:
[These metaphors of personal identification] are the entr6es to human
understanding, to the appreciation of one another. They demand to be
grasped. Grasping them is part of one's commitment to being human,
for being human requires knowing what it is to be human, and that
requires the intimate recognition of other human beings.29
And so it is with advocacy. If we were not corporeal human
beings-who love and lust and hunger and envy and feel and believe, as
well as think-we might not need to worry about ethos or pathos. In
that event, of course, we'd also have far fewer grounds for dispute, and
far less work for advocates. But we are corporeal beings, and we do
love and lust and hunger and envy and feel and believe.30
In our world, there are many requirements for effective persuasion.
For example, we must have a theory of the case. We must know the
points that we are willing to concede. We must know the points on
26. Id. at 54.
27. Id. at 65.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 85.
30. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE REASONS OF LOVE 64 (2004) ("There is a striking and
instructive resemblance in this matter between love and reason. Rationality and the capacity to
love are the most powerfully emblematic and most highly prized features of human nature. The
former guides us most authoritatively in the use of our minds, while the latter provides us with the
most compelling motivation in our personal and social conduct. Both are sources of what is
distinctively humane and ennobling in us. They dignify our lives. Now it is especially notable that
while each imposes upon us a commanding necessity, neither entails for us any sense of
impotence or restriction. On the contrary, each characteristically brings with it an experience of
liberation and enhancement.").
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which we must stand fast at any cost. We must know the difference.
And we must know at what point in the litigation we should be willing
to waive or concede those points that are worth making, but are not
central to our theory of the case. Those requirements, and others, are
important to persuasion. But none is more important than striving to see
the world, including our clients and ourselves, through the eyes of
others.
